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Abstract
The Domain Name System (DNS) was origi-
nally designed with the assumption that the DNS
will return the same answer to any given query re-
gardless of who may have issued the query, and that
all data in the DNS is thus visible. Such an assump-
tion can no longer be justified for private Internet
hosts, particularly mobile laptops and PDAs. IP ad-
dresses in the DNS reveal a host’s geographic lo-
cation and corporate affiliation to anyone that is in-
terested without the host’s knowledge or consent.
This paper identifies an attack that allows anyone
on the Internet to covertly monitor mobile devices
to construct detailed profiles including user identity,
daily commute patterns, and travel itineraries. We
identify a growing number of users vulnerable to
this attack (two million and climbing), and covertly
monitor over one hundred thousand of them. We
demonstrate the feasibility and severity of such an
attack in today’s Internet. We further propose short-
term and long-term defenses for the attack.
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a
core Internet infrastructure that maps user-friendly
mnemonics to non-user-friendly IP addresses. The
DNS resolves IP addresses for both public ser-
vices1 like Google, as well as private services2 such
as Alice’s personal laptop. The DNS does not dis-
tinguish between the scope of the services it re-
solves.
As stated in RFC 4033 [1], the DNS was orig-
inally designed with the assumption that the DNS
will return the same answer to any given query re-
gardless of who may have issued the query, and that
all data in the DNS is thus public. The DNS does
1Services available to everyone e.g. www.google.com
2Services available to a small group of people e.g. al-
ice.dyndns.org
not provide any authorization mechanism or other
means of differentiating between inquirers. Indeed,
DNS nameservers don’t even know the IP address
of the querying host. Network DoS attackers ex-
ploit this shortcoming to learn the IP address of the
victim and overwhelm the victim’s link to the Inter-
net. This paper identifies an attack whereby merely
learning the IP address of the victim can result in a
breach of privacy as defined in [2].
An IP address encodes a wealth of information
about the host. The address identifies the host’s ISP
(university, corporation, residential broadband ISP
etc.), and the geographical location of the host to
within a nearby city [3]. This information is avail-
able in public WHOIS databases, reverse DNS en-
tries [4], and commercial databases [5].
Private services that wish to use user-friendly
DNS names are consequently forced to make their
existence and location visible to everyone on the In-
ternet. Alice, for instance, may wish to run a private
FTP server on her personal laptop that she can use
to transfer files to and from her laptop whether she
is at work or at home. Since the laptop acquires a
different IP address each time she connects, Alice
is forced to relearn her address each time. Alterna-
tively, Alice can configure her laptop to update the
DNS with its latest address such that she can use
a stable user-friendly DNS name in her FTP client.
By putting her address in the DNS for her own per-
sonal use, however, Alice reveals her geographic lo-
cation to everyone on the Internet.
DynDNS [6], No-IP [7], TZO [8], and many
other online services [9, 10, 11] cater to individuals
that wish to register DNS names and dynamically
update their IP address mapping. The most popu-
lar amongst these services has a growing user-base
of two million users. As we report later, a majority
of these DNS names are for mobile hosts. Com-
mon services running on these hosts include private
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FTP and web servers, BitTorrent trackers, and web-
cams. Even though each of the services may en-
force access control policy at the service level, sim-
ply allowing authorized users to use the DNS to re-
solve the network level IP address leaks private in-
formation to anyone who cares to learn it. This pri-
vacy issue was not considered one way or another
in the design of the DNS. In a largely static Internet,
the IP address does not divulge much private infor-
mation and thus the issue has not been important in
the past. In the present Internet, however, with an
increasing number of mobile private hosts, the lack
of confidentiality of private IP addresses published
into the DNS is no longer justified.
Overall this paper makes three contributions.
(1) We identify an attack that allows an attacker to
covertly monitor a victim’s location at any given
moment, and over time build a detailed profile
of the victim including the victim’s identity, daily
commute patterns, and trip itineraries. (2) We
demonstrate the feasibility of such an attack on the
Internet today by performing surveillance on over a
hundred thousand users without raising any alarms
and report the depth of private information gleaned.
(3) We propose short-term fixes to the DNS that can
be deployed today to mitigate this attack, and dis-
cuss a long-term solution for secure name resolu-
tion for private services on the Internet.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents an overview on the DNS, dy-
namic DNS services and related work in DNS se-
curity. Section 3 presents our attack. Section 4 re-
ports on a covert surveillance experiment of over
a hundred thousand Internet users. Section 5 dis-
cusses short-term and long-term measures to de-
fend against such an attack. Section 6 concludes
the paper and outlines future work.
2 DNS Overview and Related Work
The DNS describes the architecture and infras-
tructure for name resolution on the Internet [12].
The namespace is hierarchical for user-friendliness
and ease of administration. Each domain or sub-
tree of the namespace is managed by designated
nameservers called the authoritative nameservers
for that domain. An authoritative nameserver re-
sponds with the IP address (or other information
in the DNS) for a DNS name in its domain when
queried. If the DNS name lies outside the name-
server’s domain, the server can forward the query
to another nameserver that may be able to answer
authoritatively (called recursive querying ), and for-
ward the response back to the original inquirer. Al-
ternatively, the server can simply return the address
of the next server to query (called non-recursive
querying). A server that performs recursive query-
ing may cache the results of any queries that it for-
wards and respond to subsequent queries for the
same DNS name from its cache thereby improving
performance and reducing the load on the authori-
tative nameservers. Clients OS network stacks typ-
ically implement the minimum functionality neces-
sary to send the query to a recursive nameserver;
ISPs and public services provide recursive name-
servers that clients can use for all queries.
The DNS does not enforce any access control
policy before name resolution. In particular, the au-
thoritative nameserver typically does not learn the
identity of the host performing the name resolution.
This is because a recursive DNS query contains the
address of only the nameserver performing the re-
cursive lookup, and not the address of the host on
whose behalf the query is being performed. Fur-
thermore, when a response is cached and a query
answered from the cache, the authoritative name-
server does not learn that a lookup took place. Any
host on the Internet can query for the IP address of
another host through a recursive nameserver with-
out revealing the original inquirer’s identity to the
authoritative nameserver.
Dynamic DNS services such as DynDNS ad-
minister multiple zones within which a user can
create a DNS name (e.g. alice.dynalias.org, or
bob.homeip.net). The user configures a background
DynDNS client application to run on their laptop
and update the laptop’s IP address with the service
every time the IP address changes. DNS name cre-
ation and dynamic updates of the associated IP ad-
dress are performed over HTTP and protected with
HTTP-based authentication methods. The name-
servers for these dynamic DNS services, however,
are typical DNS nameservers that cannot authenti-
cate the source of a DNS query.
In addition to resolving the DNS name to an IP
address, the DNS provides inverse resolution that
maps an IP address to a canonical DNS name for
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that host. The canonical name for an IP address is
assigned by the host’s ISP. For example, the DNS
name alice.dyndns.org may resolve to 192.0.2.1 in
the address block allocated to Acme Inc. The re-
verse DNS resolution for the same IP, however, may
return host-342.acme.org as the canonical name for
the host. Anyone can find the ISP-assigned canoni-
cal name for the host that a DNS name points to.
Past work in securing DNS can be classified
into two categories. The first category deals with
protecting the DNS from outages and DoS attacks.
CoDNS [13] and CoDoNS [14] use a peer-to-peer
substrate for DNS queries in order to improve re-
siliency against failures and shield authoritative
nameservers from flash crowds and DoS attacks,
but otherwise allow anyone to resolve the DNS
name for any host. The second category of past
work deals with the integrity of DNS responses.
DNSSEC [1] provides data and origin authentica-
tion of DNS data. ConfiDNS [15] provides bet-
ter integrity of non-DNSSEC responses in CoDNS.
Gabrilovich et al. [16] identify homograph attacks
against the DNS where a user can be tricked to
resolve a look-alike DNS name instead of the in-
tended DNS name, and offer some potential so-
lutions. None of these systems authenticate the
source of the DNS query, and consequently cannot
defend against the attack identified in this paper.
Proposed replacements for the DNS allow an
individual to learn the victim’s routing and address-
ing information without the victim’s explicit con-
sent. DOA [17] unconditionally resolves an end-
point identifier to a stack of addresses revealing the
route to the destination. UIA [18] allows endpoint
addresses to be resolved as long as the endpoint
can be named; the ability to name another end-
point is transitive and is likely to be universal for
global communication. Neither of the proposed ap-
proaches are designed to protect the confidentiality
of a private host’s address.
3 Identity Trail Attack
The attack intends to track a victim’s location
covertly. The 9-line attack code is listed in Figure 1.
The attack consists of logging a DNS lookup (line
6) and IP address to geolocation result (line 8) ev-
ery hour. The geolocation uses a public service [5]
that returns the city, province, and country of the
1: #!/bin/bash
2: HOST=victim.dynalias.net
3: GEO=’http://www.ippages.com/simple/’
4: FLD=’hostname,ip,city,state,country’
5: while sleep 3600; do
6: IP=$(host $HOST | awk ’{print $4}’)
7: date
8: curl -s "$GEO?get=$FLD&ip=$IP"
9: done
Figure 1: BASH shell script tracking the location of
victim.dynalias.net every hour.
host as well as the canonical hostname for the IP
address. The attack assumes that the attacker knows
the DNS name of the victim’s laptop; the next sec-
tion discusses how an attacker can learn the names
of hundreds of thousands of potential victims. The
attack uses only public services such as the DNS
and IP geolocation. The attack does not require
superuser privileges, nor does it need to send any
packets to the host being monitored. Finally, thou-
sands of hosts can be monitored in parallel. The
extent of private information that can be extracted
using this attack is explored in the next section.
4 Attack Validation
In order to determine the feasibility and sever-
ity of launching the described attack over the Inter-
net today, we monitored the mobility of over a hun-
dred thousand Internet users. The attack involved
discovering names of potential victims and moni-
toring their IP address for extended periods of time
without being detected. Finally, we analyzed the
mobility patterns in the trace to profile our victims’
daily commute patterns, business and personal trip
itineraries and, in some cases, even the identities of
the victim.
4.1 Discovering DNS Names
We discovered 36,011 potential victims
through a variety of methods. In our first experi-
ment, we targeted users of the DynDNS service by
first performing Google and Yahoo! searches for all
65 DynDNS-controlled domains under which users
can register DNS names. We found 4351 DNS
names (far fewer than we expected) mentioned in
web pages, mailing list archives, usenet posts, and
other publicly searchable forums. In our second
experiment, we performed a dictionary scan of
four of the most popular DynDNS domains. Our3
Figure 2: Tracking a user’s summer road-trip through
the DNS
dictionary consisted of 24,289 combinations of
common first and last names and initials. The scan
successfully resolved 31,660 DNS names with
a success rate of up to 39% for the dyndns.org
domain; the high success rate suggest similarities
with [19] where the authors find that registered
userids, in many cases, match first or last names of
the user. The scan was performed from 40 hosts
in 5 hours and rate-limited to an aggregate of
5 packets per second to DynDNS to avoid de-
tection. Only 9 of the hosts discovered in the
dictionary scan were also returned by the online
search engines suggesting almost all the names
discovered by the dictionary scans are for private
services. To verify this hypothesis, we performed
a third experiment where we used Nmap [20] to
scan a subset of the hosts discovered to determine
the services provided. We discovered that 50% run
HTTP servers, 21% run FTP servers, and 11% run
the Windows File-and-Printer sharing service;
the FTP and Windows services typically require
authentication while the HTTP homepage for
unauthorized users is typically devoid of content
and hyperlinks.
Overall we make the following three observa-
tions. (1) The services discovered are intended for
private use based on service authentication and the
lack of advertisement on public Internet forums. (2)
An attacker can covertly discover a large number of
potential victims. (3) Poorly chosen DNS names
registered by DynDNS users, in some cases, may
leak the name of the user for a mobile host.
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Figure 3: Tracking a user’s daily commute and travel
through the DNS
4.2 Monitoring Hosts
In our first surveillance experiment, we moni-
tored 18,720 hosts from 7/20 to 8/8/06 and found
evidence of deliberate user mobility. The moni-
toring load was rate-limited to 1 packet per sec-
ond and did not raise any alarms at DynDNS or
at the source. Figure 2 is a screenshot of a sum-
mer road-trip taken by user M as tracked by our
application. M’s name resolves to a Seattle IP on
7/20. It subsequently resolves to Port Angeles WA
on 7/21, and continues down a southern route along
the west-coast through Otis OR, Smith River CA,
Garberville CA, Los Angeles CA, Los Alamos CA,
and Garden Grove CA at 1–2 day intervals. M
then resolves to Las Vegas, NV for 3 days start-
ing the night of 8/2. Finally, M appears to drive
north through Montana back home to Saskatoon,
Canada on 8/8, which is where he was resolved to
on 11/7 as well. Based on reverse DNS lookups, M
logs in through local broadband ISPs except on 7/29
when M logs in through a dial-up ISP whose proxy
servers are located in Reston, Virginia; fundamental
limitations of geolocalization pertaining to proxies
are explained in [3]. M runs a local firewall con-
figured to filter all inbound packets. Unfortunately,
we were unable to disambiguate M’s real identity
enough to contact him for verification.
We verified the correctness of our application
in our second surveillance experiment where we
tracked the authors of this paper and compared their
traces to real-world data. Figure 3 plots the mobil-
ity of one of the authors from 8/18 to 11/2/06. All
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Figure 4: Tracking the mobility of 128,000 users
the information in the figure was gathered by per-
forming geolocalization and reverse DNS lookups
for the IP address. Geolocation within the United
States was correct to within 100 mi, and in Italy was
correct to within 250 mi. The daily commute pat-
terns are usually correct to within one or two hours,
but in some instances when the author did not turn
the tracked laptop on for several hours after com-
muting, the trace is inaccurate. The trace, how-
ever, does accurately capture university holidays,
work related trips and one airport layover. Based
on the reverse DNS lookups suggesting the user’s
academic affiliation and trip to Cisco Systems Inc.
in San Jose, and the overlap of the Italy trip with
a popular data communications conference in Italy
during the same period, there was enough infor-
mation to narrow down the identity of the person
tracked to within two people in the university CS
department. Additional public information avail-
able on the department homepage yielded a unique
match.
In our third surveillance experiment, we follow
128,000 DNS names for 77 days beginning 8/14/06.
Anonymized update records were obtained from
logs kept by DynDNS. We filter out updates where
consecutive IP addresses for a user belong to the
same /24 subnet, or belong to the same ISP and
are geolocated to the same city in order to discount
DHCP-related updates. Figure 4 plots the number
of unique cities, provinces, countries and networks
that mobile users were resolved to. As evident from
the figure, the median number of updates across all
users was 64; in the median case a user logged in
from 15 cities, and 3 states over the course of our
measurement. The number of users connected to
more than one ISP was 15,055, while that geolo-
cated to more than one country was 10,539. Over
91% of the users in our DynDNS-log dataset ap-
peared to move between at least two locations.
Overall we make the following four observa-
tions. (1) An overwhelming majority of users up-
dating their IP address on DynDNS are mobile
users. (2) The IP address can accurately track a user
to within a few hundred miles. (3) The extent of pri-
vate information leaked over time is potentially sig-
nificant enough to reconstruct trip itineraries, daily
commute patterns, and in some cases, narrow down
the identity of the user. (4) This entire surveillance
operation can be performed covertly by any attacker
on the Internet.
5 Solutions
Fundamentally, the attack illustrated in the pre-
vious two sections exploits the lack of access con-
trol policy enforcement in the DNS for name reso-
lution. At present, any attacker on the Internet can
track the mobility of any DNS-named host at any
given time. In the short-term, nameservers can use
heuristics to limit the scope of the attack without re-
quiring any client modifications. In the long-term,
however, the core issue of policy for name resolu-
tion of private services must be tackled.
5.1 Short-Term Defense
The DNS does not provide any mechanism for
a host to specify access control policies for its own
name. One fix would be to encourage users to pick
hard-to-guess DNS names and restrict their dissem-
ination to trusted parties. Another complementary
fix would be for the authoritative nameserver to re-
strict host lookup to a white-list of recursive name-
servers authorized for that host. The white-list may
be set statically by the user, dynamically by the
update application, or heuristically by the name-
server based on query patterns. Deploying a white-
list does not require changes to the DNS protocol
or client applications. This approach relies on ac-
cess control of ISPs’ recursive nameservers. The
approach protects against attackers on networks far
from the victim, but not from attackers on the same
network as the victim since both would have ac-5
cess to a common ISP recursive nameserver, which
would be on the white-list.
A flawed way to add access control to the DNS
protocol itself is to encrypt responses so only au-
thorized users may decrypt them. Users of the pri-
vate service could configure shared secrets or pub-
lic keys with the authoritative nameserver. The
nameserver could then encrypt the IP address using
symmetric or asymmetric encryption [21, 22] based
on the attack model. Performing cryptographic op-
erations on nameservers, however, is likely to be
an unacceptable bottleneck, especially for services
that provide resolution for a large number of private
hosts.
5.2 Long-Term Defense
Modifying the name resolution process to
identify the inquirer and to directly involve the ac-
cess control policies of the private host provides se-
cure and scalable name resolution in the long run.
Consider a name resolution architecture where Al-
ice’s laptop registers its IP address with a registrar.
The registrar plays the role similar to that played
by an authoritative nameservers in the DNS. In or-
der to communicate with Alice, Bob contacts the
registrar. Instead of returning Alice’s IP address to
Bob, however, the registrar proxies Bob’s query to
Alice’s IP address and proxies Alice’s responses to
Bob much like in SIP [23]. The registrar conceals
Alice’s IP address from Bob. Alice can conduct an
identification protocol over this proxied path, and
reveal her IP address to Bob if he is granted access.
As an optimization, the registrar can itself enforce
access control policy registered by Alice in order
to reduce lookup latency. While this proxy-based
end-to-end name resolution architecture doesn’t al-
low for in-network caching, it has been shown that
caching the heavy-tail of DNS queries [24] for pri-
vate hosts is of little value in the first place [25].
Proxy-based end-to-end secure name resolu-
tion compliments emerging Internet architectures
for private hosts. In [26], the authors propose an In-
ternet architecture where endpoints negotiate pro-
tocol stacks, configuration parameters and coordi-
nate the opening of NAT/firewall ports given a third
party to proxy connection-setup messages; the reg-
istrar used for secure name resolution can provide
this proxy service for private hosts.
More research is needed, however, to better
understand the privacy-performance trade-off for
the DNS as well as for end-to-end secure name-
resolution in the context of public and private ser-
vices. For public services, it may be the case
that there is no need to replace the DNS with the
more heavy-weight approach as policy usually al-
lows anyone to learn the IP address. For private ser-
vices, on the other hand, it may be the case that the
need for security outweighs the performance hit.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents an attack on mobile users
that dynamically register their IP address in the
DNS. The attack allows any attacker on the Internet
to covertly glean private information about the user
including daily commute patterns and itineraries for
trips. The paper demonstrates the ease with which
hundreds of thousands of vulnerable users can be
monitored without their knowledge. This informa-
tion could easily be logged for later use should the
attacker later learn or infer the identity of the user.
The root cause of the attack lies in the lack of access
control for DNS name resolution combined with an
increasing number of mobile Internet users. This
paper suggests a short-term patch to existing DNS
services that restricts the scope of the attacker, and
a more long-term solution that involves end-to-end
secure name resolution for private services on the
Internet. The proposed solutions are preliminary in
that we do not have a lot of field experience with
them. One goal of this paper is to draw the atten-
tion of the community to attacks on the DNS that
stem from design assumptions in the original Inter-
net architecture that are no longer valid.
Because this attack exploits the public nature
of IP addresses for private hosts, this paper ad-
ditionally suggests that it is appropriate to ask
whether the DNS with its focus on public services
should be supplemented with a secure name resolu-
tion service for private hosts.
We certainly do not answer this question—
indeed we have not fully implemented the end-to-
end name resolution architecture, much less exper-
imented with it on a broad scale and studied its se-
curity provisions. We do believe, however, that se-
cure name resolution for private services deserves
debate within the research community.6
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